Briefing MONTHLY #96 | May 2026

Foreign ministers from Australia, Japan, India and the United States are hoping a port in Fiji is enough to revive a grouping that could quietly slip away. Like the Xi-Trump Summit a few weeks earlier, the gathering of Quad ministers in New Delhi was notable for what it didn’t include. Joint construction of a new port in Fiji is not nothing (though as Devpolicy notes, it’s unfortunate Fiji wasn’t in the room), particularly after Beijing has ploughed millions into such infrastructure through its Belt & Road program. However, there was still no commitment from the four nations to a Quad leaders’ summit, now more than a year overdue.  

The future of the Quad is just one of many moving parts. As security and defence chiefs gathered in Singapore for the annual Shangri-La Dialogue over the weekend, there was a growing sense of displacement. The Trump administration has been uncharacteristically consistent this month in its messaging to the Indo-Pacific nations. For this region, the big geopolitical takeaway from the month was Washington’s reframing of its view of Beijing. (see NEIGHBOURHOOD WATCH).

Closer to home, there’s been a fascinating development with mining giant Anglo American announcing it has struck a deal to offload its Australian coal mines to a company founded by an Indonesian billionaire. This is also a story of economic nationalism. The Indonesian mining sector has snapped up assets from foreign companies that have been forced to divest (see DEALS & DOLLARS).

Finally, thanks to those who have subscribed to Briefing MONTHLY this year. We appreciate every sign-up.

Thanks for reading.

Emma Connors
Briefing MONTHLY editor

A year ago, US Defence Minister Pete Hegseth took to the stage at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and let it rip. He demanded all allies and friends of the US up their military spending to combat the threat posed by a rising China. This year, his message to those gathered at the annual event hosted by the IISS was very different.

“Relations between the United States and China are better than they’ve been in many years,” Hegseth said. He again urged his audience to up defence spending, but the goal is now “strategic stability”. 

Hegseth acknowledged the concerns of many in the audience when he said there was “rightful alarm” in the region “regarding China’s historic military build-up and the expansion of its military activities in the region and beyond”.  But while the US insisted China “respect our longstanding position” as a Pacific nation, the tone from Hegseth was: we’re fine with how they are doing that now.

The speech reflected a “far less confrontational” position than he projected a year ago, reflected Wang Dong, a professor at Peking University’s School of International Studies in Beijing, who attended both years. Wang told the (paywalled) Washington Post that Trump was shifting away from the Washington establishment on China policy. This is a good thing from Beijing’s point of view. The MAGA agenda has “no interest” in building a liberal world order under a hegemonic America, Wang said.

The Hegseth speech hit the same note as US President Donald Trump’s musings during his visit to Beijing to meet leader Xi Jinping earlier in th month. “We’re two very powerful countries. I call it the G-2.” In the end, the much-hyped Beijing summit was significant – but not because it achieved great things. Rather, it was the clearest sign yet that the US pivot to Asia is over. 

Back in 2011, then President Barack Obama declared the US was “all in” in Asia. Washington’s view at that time was it needed to invest resources and attention in the region to prevent China becoming the dominant power. If you judge the success or otherwise of this policy by the degree to which China has built up its military, or become the dominant trading partner and investor across the region, or pressed its maritime claims, you would have to say it has failed. Either way, there does not appear to be any enthusiasm in the Trump administration for taking on China itself or going into bat for any other nation who wished to do so.

In an interview with Fox News recorded just before he left Beijing, Trump said Taiwan should “cool it” and that he would prefer to avoid any kind of American intervention. “I’m not looking to have somebody to go independent and, you know, we’re supposed to travel 9,500 miles to fight a war. I’m not looking for that. I want them to cool down. I want China to cool down.”

Never mind that Trump’s calculation was a bit off – Taipei is around 7,800 miles from Washington. The distance from the US capital to Tehran is about 6,400 miles – not a big deal in percentage terms. The point is the Middle East matters to Washington. Asia, not so much.

“This summit sent shockwaves through Asia,” said Danny Russel, distinguished fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute, in this webinar. He noted that Trump appeared to have swung around to Beijing’s framing of Taiwan. “I’d suggest that Tokyo and Seoul in particular were rattled by Trump’s Taiwan comments … these indicated plainly that security commitments by the United States are now up for negotiation.”

Within a week, Russian President Vladimir Putin was standing where Trump had stood on the red carpet in Beijing. Newsrooms around the world played side-by-side videos or put up nifty photo sliders of the two visits to show the two leaders received the exact same level of pomp and ceremony.

The imagery was important and the intention was clear. Asia Society vice president Jing Qian said Beijing is sending clear messages with the procession of world leaders to the Chinese capital this year. Already, the leaders of the other four UN Security Council permanent members – the US, the UK, France and Russia – have made their way.

“For the domestic audience, the message is we are doing very well in China, and the world is getting increasingly chaotic,” said Jing in the Asia Society webinar. “So, the people of China, you should be grateful for the ruling party, the CCP. And for the international audience, [the message is] if you want to get global problem resolved, you should come to China.”

In the run-up to India’s 2024 general election, India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) party was widely expected to keep its majority. This did not happen. After the 642 million votes cast in the world’s largest democracy were counted, the BJP was ahead but its share of the vote was its lowest since 2014 and it had to rely on coalition partners to secure government. It seemed fair to assume this would be Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s last term – though he thought otherwise. Such speculation now seems premature. The BJP won an historic victory in West Bengal, India’s third-largest state on May 4, crushing an opposition stronghold. The party now rules 22 of the 26 Indian states and territories. With West Bengal, its reversal of fortunes after 2024 seems complete – and Modi is charging ahead. The Economic Times summarised the impact, saying West Bengal was seen as the "Great Wall" against the Modi juggernaut; its collapse would now “shatter the morale of the opposition and likely spark immediate internal fractures”.

There were extraordinary scenes in the Philippines Senate this month as Senator Ronald Dela Rosa, sought by the International Criminal Court, evaded capture. Gunfire in the building ensured the incident made international headlines. It also underlined the deep rift between two of the country’s most powerful families. President Ferdinand Marcos Jnr has been cooperating with the ICC in its investigation and pending trial of former president Rodrigo Duterte. The Philippines Senate has begun the impeachment trial of Duterte’s daughter and serving vice president Sara Duterte.

Behind the dramatic politics is a nation in serious economic strife thanks in part to global oil shortages; and one with a rare opportunity to make lasting change as it confronts the difficulties caused by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

The ASEAN and China Code of Conduct for the South China Sea has shown few signs of progress since discussions began close to a quarter of a century ago. For those outside of ASEAN, it’s a head-scratcher. China believes the nine-dash line outlines its maritime reach; ASEAN nations rely on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and a 2016 tribunal ruling demonstrated the two are not compatible. Chinese Coast Guard ships regularly accompany fishing vessels that don’t observe the sovereign waters of other nations under UNCLOS and even ram other ships – particularly Philippine vessels. So how can the sides negotiate a code of conduct if they start from two different points?

President Marcos is trying to find a middle way.